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THE FARM CREDIT SITUATION 
FACTORS CAUSING THE FARM CREDIT PROBLEM 
There is mistaken belief that, for the farm sector, the farm credit 
problem is caused by a decline in farm income. Net cash Earm income, which is 
a measure of immediate financial stress, averaged $36.3 billion from 
1978-1980 and $38.8 billion from 1983-85, a 7% increase. In addition, 
interest expense (excluding Earm households) increased from $12.5 billion in 
1979 to $20.2 billion in 1984, a 62% increase. These figures suggest that if 
interest expense had not increased, net cash farm income would be $10.2 
billion greater than in 1979. This in turn suggests that farmers who have 
little or no interest expense are better off as a group than in 1979. 
The question becomes what caused the increase in interest expense. 
Interest rates are usually cited. But this alone is not the cause. According 
to USDA figures, average interest on outstanding farm debt, including farm 
households, increased from 8.5% in 1979 to 9.9% in 1984. Total farm debt 
(including farm households) averaged $153.5 billion during 1979 and $214.4 
billion during 1984. Applying 1979 interest rate to 1984 debt yields interest 
expense of $18.2 bilLion, which is only $2.9 billion less than the $21.1 
billion in interest expense for 1984 (including farm households) but $5.1 
billion more than 1979 interest expense of $13.1 billion (including farm 
households). 
The conclusion is that a major cause of the farm credit problem was the 
tremendous serge in farm debt between 1979 and 1984 (actually 1982 since it 
has declined slightly since). Individual farmers were hurt by increasing 
interest rates and declining farm income, but the farm sector numbers suggest 
that farm debt is a far more important variable. 
The policy implication is that, to deal with the farm credit problem an~ 
to insure survival of a farm, an interest rate buy-down program wilt go only 
part of the way. Farm debt must also be reduced. 
SOLUTIONS IN PLACE 
INTEREST RATE BUY-DOWN 
The farm bill contains an up to three year interest rate buy-down program 
for FmHA guaranteed loans. Funded at $490 mi 11 ion over 3 years. The 
Secretary will fund up to 50%, but not more than 2 percentage points, of 
any buy-down agreed to by the commercial lender of the guaranteed loans. 
Under this provision of the Farm Bill, the Secretary may obtain a 
conservation easement for a period of not less than 50 years on land 
secured by an FmHA loan. In return for the easement, the Secretary shall 
cancel a proportional amount of the outstanding loan. 
FARM CREDIT SYSTEM RELIEF BILL 
The ultimate purpose of this bill was to reassur~ the bond markets about 
the long term survivability of the Farm Credit System. The bill has 
evidently been successful since the basis diff~rential between farm 
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credit system bonds and treasury bills has narrowed from as much as 100 
basis points to around 40-60 basis points. This decline in the basis 
has helped farmers who borrow from Farm Credit System. 
FARM BILL 
One goal of the Farm Bill was to freeze target prices for two years, with 
a slow decline for the next two. By maintain£ng farm income some 
marginal farmers can keep their cash flow up to the point where they can 
survive. The problem is that the Farm Bill does not target its income 
assistance to those in financial stress. Therefore, most of its income 
maintenance benefit goes to farmers who would probably survive anyway. Of 
course, any decline £n farm income caused by Gramm-Rudman-Hollings will 
increase financial stress and the number of bankruptcies. 
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
COMMERCIAL INTEREST RATE BUY-DOWN 
Senator Boschwitz has proposed a federal, state, and lender buy-down of 
interest rates. His proposal called for each to contribute 2, 2, and 1 
percentage point buy-down. This proposal has the potential, if targeted 
correctly, to help farmers who could survive with increased cash flow 
from interest rate reductions alone, but it would do little for most 
farmers under financial stress since their debt loads are too great. 
LOAN LOSS AMORTIZATION 
Senators Dixon and Zorinsky have proposed allowing ~ommercial banks to 
amortize their loan losses over a 10-30 year period instead of taking the 
loss in only one year. This would increase the survivability of the bank 
by reducing the drain on capital reserves. It would probably also lead 
to lower interest rates because the bank would not have to increase 
interest rates to offset their loan losses. Senator Garn agreed to hold 
hearings on this proposal during early 1986. 
FEDERAL LAND BANK RESERVE 
It has been proposed that the federal government take over land which is 
or shortly will be foreclosed. The purpose is to keep the land off the 
market for a limited period of time (up to 10 years), thereby proping up 
land prices. This proposal appeals to lenders because by proping up land 
prices the potential for loan losses is reduced, i.e. they can sell the 
foreclosed asset for a higher value. This proposal does little for 
farmers under stress because it is the burden of their debt, not lhe 
value of their assets, that causes financial stress. Also, there is no 
reason to believe that this approach would permenantly increase or 
stabilize land prices because the federal government would eventually 
sell the land. 
